The Russian Long Game in Syria

On March 14, Vladimir Putin announced the withdrawal of Russian forces from Syria, declaring their campaign "a success".

 

Within hours, aircraft and crews were observed departing from Khmeimim Air Base, near the Northern city of Latakia. Since then, the media has been buzzing with speculation on the reasons for this "unexpected" move. Much of the speculation is dead wrong.

 

Let me be as clear as I can: There is no Russian withdrawal from Syria, but rather a highly publicized draw-down of a few combat aircraft from the Russian built Khmeimim Air Base. Putin simply moved a few pieces on the board, without changing a thing.

 

This gambit is more about perceptions than military reality. It constitutes a political re-framing of Russia's mission in order to solidify Russia's long-term military footprint in Northwestern Syria...while convincing the citizens at home that the campaign is "over".

 

Putin's statement is another successful domestic and international publicity coup, which had nothing to do with how Russia leaves Syria...but rather how it stays - permanently.

 

In a widely broadcast video of Putin instructing Russian Defense Minister Shoigu and Foreign Minister Lavrov ( English transcript) to "start" withdrawal, he orders that Russia's existing bases in Tartus (Navy) and Khmeimim (Air Force) will continue to "function as they do now, and must be reliably defended from the land, sea, and air."

 

Putin said that the S-400 long range anti-aircraft missiles, along with shorter range systems, will remain in place. Russia's main military bases will continue operations: with naval cover, a ground contingent for 'force protection', and an unknown number of troops still on the ground advising Syrian forces.

 

While Russia is withdrawing Su-25 strike aircraft and Su-34 bombers, it's leaving Su-24 bombers and Mi-24 and Mi-35 attack helicopters, as well as Su-30SM and Su-35 multirole fighters. These aircraft continue to operate over Syria, having conducted strikes in recent days in support of Syrian army efforts to retake Palmyra from ISIS.

 

According to the Russian webpage: "Sputnik": "Nearly 20 Russian combat aircraft, an air defense system and some 2,000 personnel will stay at Khmeimim airbase in Syria, including a squadron of Su-24 tactical bombers that during the main stage of the campaign conducted most of the airstrikes."

 

"The newest Su-30 and 'Generation4+++' Su-35 fighters will also stay at the Khmeimim airbase for 'aerial protection'"

 

Russia's Deputy Defense Minister Nikolai Pankov stated that intense combat operations will continue against ISIS and al-Nusra Front, in support of Assad's advancing troops.

 

So far, Russia's naval squadron has shown no sign of leaving the eastern Mediterranean, and there is no evidence of any significant withdrawal of tanks, artillery, armored personnel carriers (APCs), troops or support units.

 

In other words, what is happening is a partial drawdown of forces that were surged into Syria after the shooting down of a Russian Su-24 by Turkey in November 2015.

 

With Russia keeping control of the Khmeimim airbase and continuing to expand and harden the Tartus naval base, the permanent Navy and Air Force military infrastructure is actually expanding. The fighters and bombers that were withdrawn can easily be returned on short notice. Nothing is leaving that cannot come back within days.

 

So why declare a withdrawal now? Keeping and maintaining equipment and personnel in Syria has never been expensive for Russia. On the contrary, the operation has provided an invaluable training, testing and military hardware showcasing opportunity.

 

Declaring victory and announcing that (some) Russian forces are going home serves Putin in several ways:

1. It gives him political leverage with Assad in the current Geneva peace talks: Putin wants Assad to accept a compromise at the talks, and abandon any ambitions to reconquer all of Syria. If Syria breaks the ceasefire, or obstructs negotiations, Assad cannot know for certain that Russia will support him.
2. Since his domestic Russian audience is even more important to Putin than Syria's future, he had to cash in politically on Russia's recent military "successes" before any further complications can occur. By declaring victory and calling an end to the operation, he locked in his gains in both domestic and international public opinion, regardless of what comes out of the ceasefire or peace negotiations, bumping his approval ratings at home.
3. Putin is using this declaration to recast the military operations in Syria as a "traditional" military "presence", thus "normalizing" it for his domestic audience. Putin said it in plain Russian: The military presence moving forward will be considered Russia's traditional footprint in Syria, and not an ongoing operation.

Putin's announcement last Monday was never about how Russia leaves Syria, but rather about how it stays to secure its Middle East interests. Putin is betting that Russian voters and the international community will accept Russian permanent military presence in Syria as the new "normal"... And that is Putin's 'Long Game' in Syria.

The Insignificance of Iran's Election Results

On December 10, 1979, Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini told a meeting with the Islamic Republic Television and Radio Committee: "In the revolution that was achieved in Iran, people were screaming that they wanted Islam; these people did not rise up so their country could have democracy".

Despite extensive, generally positive media reporting on the results of Iran's recent elections to the Iranian Majlis (parliament), these results, in fact, mean nothing. Every stage of the elections was tightly controlled and orchestrated by the real rulers of the Islamic Republic: the all-powerful and unchallenged senior officers of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp - the IRGC, together with the undemocratic "Deep State" institutions explained below.

According to Dr. Laurence A. Franklin*, it's important to note that Iranians who oppose to the current regime "have been broken physically and psychologically by a combination of regime cruelty and lack of support from the world's democracies. The people, though sullen, appear resigned to their fate. The dispirited state of the populace has proven advantageous for the ruling clique of the regime's Praetorian Guard, the IRGC, the politically reactionary mullahs, and the economy's kleptocratic-bureaucrats who rule with virtual impunity".

As for the recent elections in Iran, hundreds of moderate and reformist candidates were disqualified from running on grounds of:

1. Being ideologically opposed to the current strict Islamic regime
2. Having "moral turpitude"
3. Other vague reasons irrelevant in any real democratic process. 

So faced with a thoroughly vetted slate of pro-regime, pro-Islamic rule candidates, the voters cast ballots for cleverly marketed, regime-acceptable "moderates". 

As Dr. Franklin wrote last week in an article for the Gatestone Institute: "The political superstructure of Iran's government is much like that of the former Soviet Union. The offices of the President, the Majlis and the Civil/Criminal Court System have little real decision-making power. They are more for show, for the people to let off steam, and for foreign observers who might imagine that from there, the seeds of democracy might take root".

But contrary to what these foreign observers may fantasize, the Rouhani era will not usher in an Iran which will conduct itself like a normal member of the nation-state system. The three supposedly "democratic" branches of government: executive, legislative and judiciary will always remain subordinate to the real power in the Islamic Republic of Iran: the so-called "Deep State" institutions.

These institutions: The Council of Guardians, the Assembly of Experts, the Ministry of Information and Security (MOIS), the IRGC's Intelligence Bureau, the Special Courts, and the Office of the Supreme Leader stay largely insulated from external pressure and domestic calls for change.

The non-elected leaders of Iran's "deep state" institutions are even more powerful today. No election has resulted in reducing their power. In short, the regime remains much more an Islamic theocracy than a democratic republic. Its most officially hated sworn enemies are the United States and Israel. The current leadership of Saudi Arabia is also a mortal enemy of the Iranian regime, but in a different category. 

According to Dr. Franklin, "Western governments need to accept the harsh reality that the Islamic Republic of Iran remains a revolutionary regime. 

The West also needs to internalize that all decisions over ballistic missiles and associated delivery systems, the pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, export of the revolution, aggressive support of the Shi'a ascendancy in the Gulf and militant acts of inhumanity towards their own people are made by the "deep state" institutions."

Whatever the balance in the Majlis between hardliners and members who may be a bit more flexible, there will always be a significant number of deputies who are former IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), and who will harass cabinet members and political allies regarding decisions which run against the interests of the "Deep State" institutions.

And we should remember that current president, Hassan Rouhani, with all his smiles and seemingly moderate statements, is a charter member of the "Deep State" as a cleric (rank: Hojatoleslam), current member of the Assembly of Experts, close ally of the Supreme leader, and former Commander in Chief of the Air Defense Force (1985-1991).

Rouhani is not, as some naive Western leaders suggest, a part of the solution...he's a major part of the problem.

As you can see, the results of the recent elections in Iran mean absolutely nothing as far as changing that country's ideology or behavior are concerned.