Is This The Third Intifada? - Part 2

In my last column I discussed the differences between the first two Palestinian "Intifadas" against Israel (in 1987 and 2000), in an attempt to define and frame the current wave of mainly "lone wolf" terrorist attacks being perpetrated by relatively young educated Palestinians, using primarily cars, knives and scissors as weapons.

I raised three questions:

1.     Is this really the Third Intifada, or just a long delayed continuation of the Second one?

2.     And is it even, by definition an 'Intifada"?

3.     And if it is the Third Intifada, isn't the fact that it's so very different from the first two (at the moment) in the absence of central leadership and large numbers of trained and armed fighters, make it more difficult to end - let alone contain?

Here are my answers:

1.     I think that many historians will probably label this the "Third Intifada". But the label doesn't really matter. In my opinion every armed conflict Israel has fought since November 29, 1947, whether against conventional armies, well-organized, trained and armed Palestinian militias or internet-incited lone-wolf terrorists with knives and scissors, is simply a continuation of Israel's 1948 War of Independence, which ended in temporary "Cease Fires", and will continue to flare up in various forms until Israel has signed peace treaties with all the Arab Countries in the Middle East...including Palestine. The armistice agreements were intended to serve only as interim agreements until replaced by permanent peace treaties. However, no peace treaties were actually signed until decades later, and to date - only with Egypt and Jordan.

2.     No. At least not yet. According to Merriam-Webster, "Intifada" is an: "uprising, rebellion; specifically: an armed uprising of Palestinians against Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip". So far there have been far less demonstrations, mass-casualty violence (shootings, kidnappings, car and suicide vest bombings), or participation of organized, trained and armed forces than in the first two. The only noticeable organizational involvement so far, is the continuous incitement on official Palestinian Authority and Hamas media that includes glorified details of the recent "martyrs" as well as promises of big financial and personal rewards to those who join them.

3.     Difficult, yes...but not impossible. The tactics Israel used in the previous Intifada's won't work here. With no identifiable leader, no organization to pin the lone-wolf attacks on, relatively few victims and even fewer surviving young (and highly sympathetic) terrorists - targeted assassinations are out of the question. Destroying family homes is also a bad option because together with multi-angle viral pictures of dead or injured terrorists together made-up internet stories and photo shopped pictures of "Israeli soldiers" allegedly roughing up family members, just create more hatred and a desire to "avenge Palestinian honor", as one 14 year old justified attempting a knife attack after watching the Palestinian evening news on TV.

The only way, according to many Israeli analysts today, to at least try to stem the current "Internet Intifada", is for Israel to consider doing what Arik Sharon was planning before his fatal stroke...a unilateral partial withdrawal from most of the West Bank, with Israel remaining control of the "consensus" blocs (including the Jordan Valley), security assets (including airspace, strategic locations and air-waves), international crossing points (together with Jordan), etc.

We all know what the end result will look like - it's the same deal offered by Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, Ehud Barak, Ehud Olmert, Tzippi Livne, and more recently Bibi Netanyahu, to both Arafat and Abu Mazen. It's acceptable to most Israelis (as long as "Palestine" is fully demilitarized).         

And this should be started, with or without a negotiated agreement, sooner rather than later. With ISIS' footprint growing in the West Bank and Gaza...these attacks could get more deadly very quickly.

Also - with the leadership vacuum created in the Middle East by a clear weakening of US resolve, involvement and credibility, Russia and Iran have become the "go-to" default super-powers in the region.

Just look north to Syria, and imagine how a real Israeli-Palestinian conflict could hypothetically worsen, when regional and international players start getting involved.

Is This The Third Intifada? - Part 1

The current ongoing round of Palestinian terrorist attacks on Israelis. now in its fifth month, has been called various names.

Worldwide media has been using the terms: "Social Media Intifada", "Knife & Stone Uprising". Youth Rebellion" (because most of the terrorists are under the age of 20), etc.

Last October in a press conference in Spain, U.S.Secretary of State John Kerry called them: "Random acts of violence".  

Palestinian president Abu Mazen calls it the "Knife Intifada" while claiming that the murder of Jews is really "peaceful". . .

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But after the February 3 brutal attack in Jerusalem, where Hadar Cohen, a brave 19 year old newly recruited Border Police officer gave her life to prevent what would have been a major, multi-casualty attack by three heavily armed Palestinians from the West Bank, and at least six attacks this past weekend involving knives and guns, there is growing consensus in Israel that we should call it what it is...The Third Intifada, despite the serious political and security consequences that this highly charged definition entails.

This raises three questions:

1. Is this really the "Third" Intifada or just a long delayed continuation of the Second (which never actually ended but continued on low flames after Arafat's death)?
2. And is it even, by definition an "Intifada"?
3. And if it is the Third Intifada, doesn't the fact that it's so very different from the first two (at the moment!) in the absence of general support, central leadership and large numbers of trained and armed fighters, make it far more difficult to end - or even contain? 

To answer these questions we first have to go back and understand what happened in 1987 and 2000.

The first Intifada, or "popular uprising" (1987-1993), was not planned, well organized or controlled...at lease not in the beginning.  It started in Gaza when an Israeli military truck accidentally collided with a civilian car, killing four Palestinians.

Unrest, frustration with Palestinian and Arab leadership, together with incitement against Israel was already brewing in the territories Israel had captured twenty years earlier. All it took was this accident to ignite a protest movement that caught on like wildfire and spread through Gaza and the West Bank.

The initially unorganized protests involved a local strategy of resistance and civil disobedience including: general strikes, blocking main roads both in Israel and the territories and widespread, deadly, rock and Molotov Cocktail attacks against police, IDF and civilian targets. It took a while for the various PLO factions to organize, arm and take control of the protesters.

Over the next six years an estimated 2,000 Palestinians were killed by the IDF (most of them armed insurgents), while 100 Israeli civilians and 60 soldiers died. 1,400 Israeli civilians and 1,700 soldiers were injured.

The Second Intifada (AKA the "al-Aqsa" Intifada) started in September 2,000. Palestinian and world news outlets claimed that it was triggered by a much publicized visit to the Temple Mount area by Arik Sharon on September 28. However Imad Faluji, the Palestinian Authority Communications Minister, admitted that the violence had been planned in July, far in advance of Sharon's "provocation", when Arafat returned from Camp David, having rejected the American proposals for a deal with Israel."

Mahmoud Zahar of Hamas said that Arafat instructed his organization to launch terror attacks against Israel after the failure of peace negotiations.

On September 29, the Voice of Palestine, the PA's official radio station called "to all Palestinians to come and defend the al-Aqsa mosque." The PA closed its schools and transported Palestinian students to the Temple Mount to participate in the organized riots. That day, following Friday prayers, large riots broke out around the Old City of Jerusalem. 

After Palestinians on the Temple Mount threw rocks over the Western Wall at Jewish worshipers, Israeli police fired back with tear gas and rubber bullets. 

When the commander of Jerusalem's police force was knocked unconscious by a rock, they switched to live ammunition, killing four Palestinians. Up to 200 Palestinians and police were injured. Another three rock-throwers were killed in the Old City and on the Mount of Olives. 

By the end of the day, 7 Palestinians had been killed and 300 injured. 70 Israeli policemen were injured...and the Second Intifada had started.  

Unlike the First Intifada, the Second one was prepared, organized, well-armed and well-commanded, with the deployment of highly trained terrorist units like Tanzim and al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade from Arafat's Fatah faction, and Izzadin al-Kassam Brigades from Hamas. It also saw the use of many "religiously inspired" male and female suicide bombers, wearing explosive vests or driving booby-trapped cars, that blew up on Israeli streets, in restaurants, cafes, buses, social and family events, etc.

The IDF, Police and Shin-Bet fought back by land, sea and air. The fighting lasted five years. The exact date of the end of the Second Intifada is disputed, though most agree on February 8, 2005  

Casualty totals were high:

Israelis: 1,053 killed (334 IDF soldiers)

Palestinians: 4789 killed (most of them combatants)

Foreigners: 55 killed

    

In "Is This The Third Intifada? Part 2" we'll answer the three questions above, as well as look at how the recent changes in the Middle East could directly influence the length, casualty levels and consequences of the "Third Intifada" including:

1. The unchecked growth and spread of ISIS (which is already recruiting and operating in Gaza and the West Bank): 
2. The recent empowerment of Iran's fanatic hardliners in the one-sided "nuke deal"
3. The evolving war in Syria.

And we'll discuss Israel's current, medium and long term strategies to deal with it.

I agree with those analysts who argue that unless Israel does something different, dramatic and unilateral, this could become the longest and most consequential conflict in the country's 68 years.